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We locate a giant scorecard poster with social and environmental responsibility scores of the ten 
leading world food companies, measured by the Oxfam “Behind the Brands” world campaign, at 
the entrance of selected supermarkets. We test the impact of such scores on consumers’ choices 
with a randomized field experiment. Our findings show that the Oxfam ranking matters since the 
treatment has a positive and significant effect on the market share of the companies with the highest 
scores and a negative and significant effect on the companies placed at the lowest ranks. Invisibility 
matters negatively since the largest non-ranked companies selling in the store experience a slight 
fall in their market shares. More in general, we find that an improvement in the total Oxfam scores 
has a positive and significant impact on market share of the company. 
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A large and consolidated body of theoretical and empirical research in the behavioural literature 
postulates or documents the existence of other-regarding preferences. Most of this literature refers 
to laboratory experiments which show that individuals, beyond self-interest intended as the desire to 
increase their monetary endowments and consumption levels, are also driven, among others, by 
other-regarding preferences (Cox, 2004), positive and negative reciprocity (Rabin, 1993), social-
welfare preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton 
and Ockenfels, 2000), and different forms of pure and impure (warm glow) altruism (Andreoni, 
1989 and 1990). 
 
In parallel, several theoretical and empirical contributions have investigated the novel and growing 
phenomenon of corporate social responsibility (CSR).1 Most of these empirical studies focus on the 
relationship between CSR and corporate performance, while theoretical research investigates the 
impact of CSR on the traditional welfare goals of standard theoretical models (Baron, 2003; Besley 
and Ghatak, 2007; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010).   
The novelty of the present paper lies in the establishment of a nexus between these two fields 
(behavioural economics and the CSR literature) by means of a randomized field experiment where a 
poster scorecard with detailed scores of the ten largest world food companies is located at the 
entrance of selected supermarkets. This enables us to test the impact of CSR information on 
consumer choices. Information provided to customers entering the supermarkets is retrieved from 
the international Oxfam Behind the Brands campaign. The campaign provides a scorecard with 
synoptic corporate social and environmental responsibility scores for seven CSR domains 
(Transparency, Women, Workers, Farmers, Land, Water, and Climate) for each of the ten leading 
world food and beverage corporations. Scores are created by aggregating a large number of 
indicators with a rigorous methodology described in detail in the campaign website (see section 2 
below).2 For each company, the sum of the 7 CSR scores yields a synoptic number that determines 
its ranking. The scores can be found online on the campaign website where, by clicking on icons of 
the typical brands of the 10 companies, web surfers can access their detailed scores and are 
prompted to send a message of approval/disapproval to the companies.  
The Behind the Brands campaign is organised by Oxfam as a long-term challenge, with scores and 
rankings updated every 2 months. The relevance of the campaign at world level is proven by two 
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1 Two institutional definitions of CSR come from the European Commission and the World Bank. 
According to the first (EC, 2001), companies are socially responsible when they ``integrate social 
and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis''. The World Bank agreed on the definition of the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD, 2002), defining CSR as ``the commitment of 
business to contribute to sustainable economic development, working with employees, their 
families, the local community and society at large to improve quality of life, in ways that are both 
good for business and good for development''. For literature reviews on CSR see, among others, 
Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012), Hoi, Wu and Zhang (2013) and Dhaliwal et al. (2012). 
2 Information on the campaign as well as details on its methodology are available at 
http://www.behindthebrands.org/~/ 
media/Download-files/BtB%20Methodology%20document_final_Sept%202014.ashx. 
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main facts. First, 31 major investment funds, representing nearly 1.5 trillion dollars of assets under 
management have joined Oxfam’s call on the world largest food corporations to do more to reduce 
social and environmental risks in their supply chains. Second, supporters of the campaign have 
taken nearly 700,000 actions in the last three years and their action has produced corporate reaction 
and fostered an engagement process by some of the ten corporations with Oxfam itself.  
The contribution presented in this paper is absolutely novel in the literature as it enriches and 
extends a recent related and consolidating field of papers concerning the impact of reputational risk 
on corporate performance. The focus in those papers is however on banking and finance and not on 
randomized experiments. Kölbel and Busch (2013) document how negative media attention 
(proxied by the RepRisk index) tends to worsen credit risk. Minor and Morgan (2011) show that the 
positive reputation of high CSR firms helps them absorb the shock of the negative event of product 
recalls. Deng, Kang and Low (2013) find that the negative effect of stakeholder conflicts in merger 
is reduced by high CSR. In most papers in this literature CSR is mainly viewed within the 
governance domain, and its positive/negative effect works through the channel of trust. Hence, the 
reaction of the market to low responsibility does not indicate other-regarding concerns but rather the 
fear that low CSR may lead in the future to poor corporate conduct, thus generating economic 
losses to consumers and investors.  
Our paper is the first one to look at those aspects of CSR directly concerning environmental and 
social responsibility along the product chain. As such, these aspects are much less likely to be 
related with final consumers self-regarding concerns. In addition to this, the field experiment design 
helps to solve the causality problems often encountered in the above mentioned literature. At the 
same time, our field experiment does not suffer from the limitations to external validity that are 
typical of laboratory experiments. Last but not least, the focus on final consumers is consistent with 
the growing awareness that consumers’ decisions may be very relevant for orienting corporate 
behaviour, as shown by global surveys. In 2013 The Eurobarometer asked representative samples of 
citizens of the 27 EU countries “who should take the leading role in influencing companies’ action” 
(Eurobarometer, 2013). The most frequently selected answer (49 percent) was “citizens themselves 
through the purchasing decisions they make”, followed by “management of companies through the 
decision they make about what the company does” (40 percent), public authorities through policies 
and regulations (36 percent), trade unions (28 percent), investors (22 percent), and NGOs (12 
percent). In this perspective it is of foremost importance to understand how consumers react to 
information stimuli on CRS as we do in our field experiment. 
A closer reference to our work is a very limited group of papers testing the effect of green 
advertising in field experiments. Among them, Hainmueller, Hiscox and Sequeira (2015) show that 
the two most popular coffee brands in the supermarket where the experiment is held experience an 
increase in sales by almost 10 percent under a treatment represented by a Fair Trade label as 
compared to a generic placebo label. In a second label-plus-price experiment they find that sales of 
the higher price coffee brand are not significantly different after an 8 percent price increase, while 
demand for the lower priced brand is more elastic since the price increase produces a 30 percent 
decline in sales. In another field experiment aimed at testing the willingness to pay in online 
auctions, Hiscox, Broukhim and Litwin (2011) find that shoppers on eBay paid a 23 percent 
premium for Fair Trade labelled coffee. The results from these field experiments are consistent with 
the literature showing that reference to social norms has strong effects on pro-social behaviour 
(Griskevicius et al., 2006; Goldstein and Cialdini, 2008). Our work in this field is however original 
since there is no contribution in this literature testing something similar to the impact of the Oxfam 
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Behind the Brands campaign and, more generally, of an articulated set of scores on CSR on top 
world companies. 
Based on the information available from the campaign, under the assumption of standard (purely 
self-regarding) consumer preferences, we formulate the null hypothesis of no effect of such 
information on related product sales since our treatment changes neither the consumers’ choice set, 
nor product prices. For this reason, under the above mentioned assumption, there is no reason for a 
purely self-regarding consumer to deviate from her pre-information optimal bundle of products.   
We also consider the possibility that for two of the seven domains (Transparency and Climate) the 
ranked companies’ behaviour along the product chain may have indirect effects on the self-
regarding preferences of final consumers in a high-income country such as Italy where the 
experiment is held. We however show in a game theoretical setting that, even in this case, under 
reasonable parametric conditions, the optimal “free riding” consumers’ strategy is not changing 
their pre-treatment choice (see section 3 and Appendix B). 
Given this general framework we formulate three null hypotheses. First, we test whether the impact 
of the Behind the Brands scores is significant and consistent with the company’s rank. Second, we 
test whether the marginal increase in the total score is significant per se. Third, we verify the effect 
of the treatment on non-ranked companies.  
Our econometric findings show that the null of insignificance of the poster treatment is violated 
under three main respects. First, the scorecard poster treatment tends to have positive and 
significant effects on the market shares of the top ranked company, and negative and significant 
effects on those of bottom ranked companies with only one exception. Second, the marginal 
increase in the total Behind the Brands score has a positive and significant effect on the market 
shares of ranked companies. Third, the treatment is not neutral on the main non-ranked companies 
since the latter experience a negative and significant effect on their market shares. 
Our results find support for the three above mentioned statements and have straightforward policy 
implications. If public information on CSR available at shops has a significant effect on consumers’ 
choices, proper information on social and environmental responsibility of products may contribute 
to the achievement of social and environmental goals set by policymakers, alongside the more 
traditional policy tools of regulation and taxes. This type of policy intervention has much lower 
costs and exploits the leverage that a minority of consumers with other-regarding preferences can 
have on market sales and corporate conduct. 
 
 
2. The Oxfam Behind the Brands campaign 
 
The Oxfam Behind the Brands campaign focuses on the sourcing policies of the 10 largest food and 
beverage companies in the world (Associated British Foods (ABF), Coca-Cola, Danone, General 
Mills, Kellogg, Mars, Mondelez, Nestlé, PepsiCo, and Unilever) according to the Forbes 2000 
annual ranking. Aggregate yearly revenues of these companies amounted at the beginning of the 
campaign (i.e., 2013) to around $450 billion, the equivalent of the GDP of all world low-income 
countries in the same year.  
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The campaign consists of collecting information and creating aggregate scores from a large set of 
indicators in the following seven domains3 
1. Transparency at a corporate level; 
2. Women farm workers and small-scale producers in the supply chain; 
3. Workers on farms in the supply chain; 
4. Farmers (small-scale) growing the commodities; 
5. Land, both rights and access to land and sustainable use of it; 
6. Water, both rights and access to water resources and sustainable use of it; 
7. Climate, both relating to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and helping farmers adapt to climate 
change. 
Indicators are based on information retrieved from publicly available documents. For six of the 
seven domains (transparency excluded) they fall into the following four categories 
1. Awareness: Does the company demonstrate general awareness of key issues relating to that theme 
and does it conduct projects to understand and address these key issues?  
2. Knowledge: Does the company demonstrate it measures, assesses and reports key issues and facts 
specifically in its supply chains that relate to that theme?  
3. Commitments: Does the company commit to addressing the key issues relating to that theme in its 
supply chains?  
4. Supply chain management: Does the company require its suppliers to meet relevant standards 
related to that theme?  
As it can be inferred from these definitions the four categories seek to measure an increasing 
engagement in the social and environmental issues, from general awareness of the problem to the 
monitoring and enforcement of the supply chain’s conformity to high social and environmental 
standards.  
Information used to create indicators in the first (Transparency) domain is different from the above 
since it has a broader focus and involves disclosure on issues that may simultaneously involve 
several of the remaining six domains.  
An interesting characteristic of the scores we select for our field experiment is that they focus on a 
specific “downstream” and limited domain of CSR (agricultural sourcing policies), that is expected 
to be more distant from the self-interest of consumers of the final product. The scores do not in fact 
consider “upstream” domains of corporate responsibility such as corporate philanthropy that can 
create benefits for local communities in shopping places or workers’ and environmental 
sustainability in final consumers’ country. In this sense it is more difficult to argue that the rejection 
of the null (indicating that consumers are affected in their choices by the revelation of Behind the 
Brands scores) can be related to self-regarding preferences. In this respect, as is well known from 
the literature, concern and sensitivity for wellbeing of foreigners and distant people decline 
significantly during negative business cycle spells when economics tend to be considered as a fixed 
cake activity (Becchetti, Castriota and Rossetti, 2009). This makes our test even more relevant if we 
consider that our analysis is run at the end of a six-year recession producing a fall of around 14 
percent of Italian average household income (OECD, 2015). 
 
3 Descriptions of domains are retrieved from the campaign website www.behindthebrands.org. 
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In our paper we investigate whether the impact of this campaign and similar CSR scoring initiatives 
may be stronger if the information is made available for consumers not just online but also on the 
shop floor. The hypothesis is tested in a field experiment. In what follow we outline the theoretical 





3. Theoretical background and hypothesis testing 
We assume an economy populated by rational4 maximizing consumers who are choosing their 
optimal bundle of products before receiving information on the Behind the Brands campaign. More 
specifically, when entering the supermarket the i-th consumer solves the following straightforward 
utility maximization problem 
Max Ui(x,δ) 
s.t. Yi = px 
where x is the vector of goods available in the supermarket shelves that enter significantly the 
consumer’s utility function, δ is an argument generically capturing other-regarding preferences (ie. 
inequity aversion, care for other individuals, care for the environment, etc.), p the vector of product 
prices and Y is the consumer’s income. In order to test for the existence of other-regarding 
preferences we consider how consumers would behave in case of δ=0, formulate our testable null 
hypothesis on this basis and test with our randomized experiment whether the null is accepted or 
rejected. 
Under δ=0 the solution of the problem yields the following optimal pre-information choice vector  
x*=f(p,Yi) 
Consumers know product prices but are imperfectly informed about corporate behaviour along the 
supply chain.  
Our treatment consists of reducing this specific dimension of consumers’ imperfect information by 
installing the Behind the Brands poster scorecard with information on the social and environmental 
responsibility of the ten largest world food companies at the entrance of the supermarket. More 
specifically, as explained in section 2, information revealed with the experiment concerns two 
wellbeing dimensions.  The first is wellbeing of other distant individuals (i.e. the three dimensions 
of Workers, Farmers and Women) or other environmental dimensions (i.e., Water and Land) in 
distant countries that we assume should not bring any direct contribution to final consumer’s utility 
in case of purely self-regarding preferences (δ=0). Any deviation from the ex ante optimal choice 
x* therefore implies in this case the presence of other-regarding preferences. This is because the 
scorecard poster treatment changes neither the prices nor the set of opportunities available to 
consumers. Hence any deviation from the ex ante optimum implies (in absence of any other-
regarding component) the disutility of moving to a lower multi-dimensional indifference surface. 
Hence, if consumers are rational, this potential disutility must be more than offset by satisfaction of 
 
4 In the sense of consistent choice of means in order to achieve desired goals. 
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an other-regarding preference argument (i.e. concern for poor workers along the supply chain, for 
their equal opportunities, or for environmental dimensions such as water and land). 
The second wellbeing dimension concerns the corporate contribution to global public goods that 
can be enjoyed by the same final consumers. This dimension is particularly captured by the Climate 
and Transparency domains, as they might be related to overall corporate conduct affecting also final 
consumers.  In such a case the consumer may be aware that choosing products with high scores in 
these two domains may produce a positive externality on the availability of global public goods that 
can increase her utility. 
Even in this last case, with δ=0, the rational consumer who receives information on the 
higher/lower corporate responsibility of a company happens to be in a “vote-with-the-wallet” 
prisoner’s dilemma (see Appendix A and Becchetti and Salustri, 2015). By costly deviating from 
her optimal pre-information choice she can contribute to the creation of a public good (i.e. 
environmental sustainability or transparency) which she also enjoys. However, as in a standard 
multi-player prisoner’s dilemma, the dominant strategy is maintaining her previous choice even 
though coordination with other players/consumers and choice of the more responsible product is 
Pareto superior. This is the case under the reasonable assumption that a single contribution to the 
positive externality (when voting with the wallet) has costs of deviating from the pre-information 
optimal choices higher than the benefits. This is the case under the reasonable assumption that the 
individual marginal contribution to the production of the public good is negligible given the large 
number of participants to the game in mass consumer markets. 
The purely self-regarding consumer should therefore not deviate from her optimal pre-information 
choice even in this case. This is because the information does not imply changes in prices and the 
only change of choice that can positively affect her self-regarding utility concerns a public good 
component for which however the social dilemma dominates5. 
Our conclusion is therefore that significant changes from pre-information optimal choices can only 
be interpreted as revealing the presence of non purely self-regarding preferences (δ≠0) when they 
are generated by an information signal such as that of our treatment that does not alter the set of 
opportunities, income and relative prices. 
 
4. Experiment design 
 
The experiment involves four grocery stores of the biggest Italian grocery store chain called Coop. 
The stores are located in Tuscany and, more precisely, in Firenze, Lucca, Pisa, and Siena. 
 
5 The information placed at supermarkets’ entrances may be eventually interpreted as a very strong 
coordination signal modifying expectations in the direction of a higher number of expected 
consumer choices for products of the more responsible companies. Even in this case the consumer 
that modifies such expectations still has the choice of not moving from its pre-treatment choice as 
her dominant strategy, given the negligible effect of her individual decision in a mass consumer 
market game where a large number of players participate. 
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We apply a two-group, two-phase crossover design (Jones and Kenward, 2003) and randomly 
assign each store to a group corresponding to the treatment-control or the control-treatment 
experimental sequences. The first phase started on 30th May, 2016 and was in place for 4 weeks, 
after which stores started the second 4-week phase that ended on 24th July, 2016. The experiment 
lasted 8 weeks in total. 
During the control period no intervention was done and the store employees as well as the 
customers did not know that we were registering sales for the experiment purpose. In the treatment 
period we placed at the main entrance of each treated store a large poster (2m height, 1m width) 
reporting the Oxfam ranking of the 10 biggest world food companies according to their 
performance in the seven CSR domains (the original poster in Italian is reproduced in Figure 1 with 
the English translation attached). The poster was placed at the main entrance and occupied part of 
the doorway so that each customer entering the store could see it. The poster had a specific binder 
containing fliers reproducing the same poster in smaller size and reporting the Oxfam campaign 
website on the one side and a short explanation of the campaign on the other side (Figure 2). Each 
store was endowed with 1,000 fliers and remained on average with less than 100 fliers at the end of 
the experiment. During the treatment, workers of each store did not know the details of the project 
and were instructed not to provide any explanation to customers who would ask for information 
about the poster.  
 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
To provide a summary view of our descriptive findings we report the weekly sales in the stores 
selected for our experiment at brand level. In Table 1 we show the number of brands for each 
company and the frequency of weekly observations for each product brand.  The number of 
observations varies according to the number of different products sold under each brand (i.e. 
different types of Algida ice-creams under the Algida ice-cream brand) and the 
availability/unavailability of each product in the given supermarket place. As expected Unilever and 
Nestlé have the highest number of brands. Other companies have much fewer brands sold in the 
shops where the experiment is held (Kellogg’s has two brands while ABC has only one brand: 
Twinings tea). Note that the companies involved in the Behind the Brands experiment are nine and 
not ten since the Coop supermarkets where the experiment takes place have no products on their 
shelves for one of the ranked companies (General Mills). 
Table 2 displays average market shares at brand level for each company and total sales at company 
level in the treatment and control periods. From this table we see that the top ranked brand 
(Unilever) experiences a growth in sales of around 10 percent with the treatment and a similar 10 
percent increase in average market share at brand level.   At the same time total sales of companies 
ranked at the bottom tend to fall. In order to test whether these descriptive differences are 
significant we need to control for price effects, product/store specific fixed effects and week effects 
as we will do in the econometric analysis presented in the section that follows. 
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5.2 Econometric specification and hypothesis testing 
 
We test econometrically the effect of the publication of scores of the Behind the Brands campaign 
on the scorecard poster treatment by using the following specification 
,') / ! . ("(  ( . +#+  + .
'$'	' . )%)) . *&*
* . ,')        
 (1) 
where ,') measures the market share of product r of brand i at week k, BtBCompany is a (0/1) 
dummy for the j-th company ranked in the Behind the Brands campaign, Treat is a dummy taking 
value one in the treatment period and zero otherwise, NonBtBCompany is a (0/1) dummy for the six 
largest companies having products sold in the experiment selling places and not ranked in the 
Behind the Brands campaign, Price is the price for each product r of brand i,  DWeek is a (0/1) 
dummy for week k, DBrandStore is a (0/1) dummy picking up the l-th brand/store fixed effect. 
Among the controls, price levels capture the influence of brand products unit prices on brand 
product market shares. Week effects capture common factors affecting sales time dynamics such as 
average weather conditions of the specific week (i.e. higher market shares of ice-creams if the 
temperature is higher) and any news that may affect consumers’ behaviour. Brand/store fixed 
effects capture idiosyncratic time invariant components related to brand related consumption habits 
of the given shops and product characteristics. 
Based on (1) our first null hypothesis is 
H01: ("(=0 
The null implies the joint irrelevance of the treatment on treated companies and its rejection implies 
that the treatment has significant effects on ranked companies’ average product market shares. 
Our second null hypothesis is 
H02: +#+=0, 
The null implies the joint irrelevance of the treatment on non-treated companies having products 
sold in the shops where the experiment takes place, and its rejection implies that the treatment has 
significant effects on non-ranked companies’ average product market shares. 
An alternative specification where we test the marginal effect of the total Behind the Brands score is  
,') / ! . "
 . #  
 . )$)) .
*%*	
* . ,'-           (2) 
where TotalScore is the total score for each company in the Behind the Brands campaign and the 
other regressors are defined as in (1). The analysis here is limited to products of companies ranked 
in the Behind the Brands campaign. 
Based on (2), we test the following null hypothesis  
H03: #=0 , 
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The null implies the irrelevance of the total score, while its rejection on the positive side implies 
that a unit increase in the Behind the Brands total score has a positive and significant effect on 
average product market shares of the ranked companies. 
 
5.3 Econometric findings 
Findings on the impact of our treatment in a sample including observations of weekly sales 
of all products sold in the treated supermarkets are presented in Table 3. In the first specification we 
test the treatment effect on the ten companies covered by the Behind the Brands Oxfam’s campaign 
(column 1), while in a second specification (column 2) we use the fully augmented specification in 
(1) and also introduce dummies capturing the effect of the treatment on the most relevant selected 
companies not included in the ranking (Coop, Barilla, Lavazza, Mukki, Sammontana and Ferrero). 
A first important finding is that the ranking matters since six out of the nine company dummies 
interacted with the treatment dummy are significant (the F-test on the joint significance of the 
Treat*BtBCompany dummies is F(9, 156436) 76.27, p-value  0.0000, indicating rejection of the 
first null hypothesis H01 in section 5.2) in the first specification controlling for prices, week effects 
and  product-store fixed  effects. The result remains significant when we introduce the non-ranked 
company treatment-interacted dummies (NonBtBCompany variables in column 2).  
In addition to this general result we have more specific findings. First, our treatment produces a 6 
percent increase in the market share of the top ranked brand (Unilever). What is interesting as well 
is that the companies ranked second and third (Nestlé and Coca-Cola) experience insignificant 
changes in their market shares, while the impact on the 4th and 5th brands (Kellogg’s and Mars) 
becomes positive again. An interpretation for these combined findings is that the strong negative 
reputation of Nestlé and Coca-Cola at the international level and in Italy among those types of 
consumers who regularly shop at Coop supermarkets and who are in general more critical toward 
multinational companies. This negative reputation is likely to undermine and to invalidate the good 
news of their high rank in the Behind the Brands campaign.6 Beyond the heterogeneity of impact 
described above, a rank in the top five of the Behind the Brands campaign has an overall positive 
and significant impact since the null of no impact is rejected on the positive side (F(5, 156436) =  
100.69, Prob > F =    0.0000). 
 
6 An indication of the negative perception of Coca Cola and Nestlé in the general public may be 
found in the existence of a specific Wikipedia item related to such criticism. On the item “criticism 
of Coca-Cola” it is possible to find information about most of the negative corporate responsibility 
issues related to the company (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Coca-Cola). The Nestlé 
case is even more clear cut since the company suffered and is still suffering a word boycott 
campaign related to the aggressive marketing" of breast milk substitutes, particularly in less 
economically developed countries (LEDCs), largely among the poor. The Wikipedia voice “boycott 
Nestlé” dedicated to it can be retrieved at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nestl%C3%A9_boycott. 
Even though Wikipedia pages are not scientific proofs, the two explicitly negative Wikipedia pages 
related to the two companies are a clear-cut indication of their relatively higher negative perception 
in the general public. And perception is what matter in our experiment. To compare this evidence 
with what concerns the top ranked Behind the Brands company it is impossible to find a Wikipedia 
voice on Unilever boycott or criticism of Unilever. Criticism on Coca-Cola and Nestlé is therefore 
expected to be widespread among the most socially conscious consumers and customers of Italian 
coops are among the latter. 
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A third important finding is that our treatment produces negative effects on companies ranked 
between the 6th and the 9th (last) position (Mondelez, General Mills, Danone)7 with the exception of 
Associated British Food (ABC) where the impact is surprisingly positive, even though only weakly 
significant. What may matter here is that, as shown in Table 1 where we list products for each 
company sold in the treated supermarkets, ABC has only one product on supermarket shelves and 
this product (Twinings tea) is not easily identifiable with the ABC company. Furthermore, this 
product has a strong ethical reputation among Italian and world consumers, made salient by our 
experiment that induces consumers to focus on corporate social and environmental responsibility.8 
In spite of this exception, a ranking in the last four places of the Behind the Brands campaign 
produces a negative and significant effect since the null hypothesis of no impact is rejected on the 
negative side (F(4, 156436) = 56.62, Prob > F = 0.0000). Findings from the second specification 
(Table 3, column 2) confirm all the above results but provide additional evidence of a negative 
(even though small in magnitude) effect on companies not covered by the Behind the Brands 
campaign when we select the first six non-ranked companies in terms of total sales in the selected 
supermarkets (Coop, Barilla, Lavazza, Sammontana, Mukki and Ferrero)  (the joint test of their 
significant difference from zero is F(9,156430) = 315.57 (0.000), Prob>F=0.0000). Hence our 
second null hypothesis (H02) on the irrelevance of the experiment for non-treated brands is rejected 
in direction of a negative effect. This implies that the “invisibility effect” generated by not being 
among the ranked companies works negatively. A likely interpretation is that the positive effect on 
top ranked companies can erode market shares of the excluded brands.  
In interpreting our findings we must consider that rejection of the null is particularly remarkable 
given two offsetting factors that should go in the opposite direction. On the one hand, the shops 
where we perform our experiment are coop supermarkets and therefore they are usually attended by 
a selected and socially motivated sample of consumers, most of whom are Coop shareholders. We 
therefore expect that these consumers may already be aware of some of the social and 
environmental concerns raised by the campaign and incorporate them in their pre-treatment choices. 
On the other hand the experiment is run in 2016, that is, after a six-year recessionary spell that led 
Italians to lose on average 14 percent of their per capita household income after the 2008 financial 
crisis (OECD, 2015). We may reasonably expect that the crisis has made Italian consumers less 
sensitive to social and environmental issues and relatively more price sensitive than during more 
positive business cycle periods. 
As a robustness check on our main findings, we consider that the Behind the Brands campaign is 
focused on food while the 10 ranked companies also produce non-food products. We therefore 
 
7 General Mills and Danone are the only two companies having at least one score of two (the 
minimum assigned by the campaign). 
8 The Guardian discusses the disappointing performance of ABC arguing that the company “does a 
disservice to the group because, in reality, it has some highly respected ethical enterprises among its 
portfolio. Twinings for instance has forged a solid reputation as a founder member of the Ethical 
Tea Partnership.” 
(https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/associated-british-foods-transparent-nestle-
coca-cola). This article clearly shows that the reputation of Twinings tea is different from that of 
ABC. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that Coop consumers do not easily reconnect the ABC score 
to the unique ABC brand (Twinings tea) sold in Coop supermarket and focus instead of the ethical 
strength of the latter that becomes more salient with the experiment. 
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disentangle the treatment effect on food and non-food products in an augmented specification 
(Table 3, columns 1 and 2). Our findings show that the treatment effect is concentrated on food 
products. Consumers hence correctly link their behaviour to the specific object of the Behind the 
Brands campaign (the international food product chain), while the reputational effects on non-food 
products of the same companies are not significant.  
It should also be noted that the information obtained with our treatment is much richer than just a 
ranking among the 10 biggest world food companies, since we also have detailed (1-10) scores in 
the seven different domains covered by the campaign (Transparency, Women, Workers, Farmers, 
Land, Water, Climate). We therefore test whether the absolute score values matter in a different 
specification where the brand dummies disappear and we simply introduce a baseline total score 
variable (TotalScore) plus a total score variable interacted with the treatment dummy 
(Treat*TotalScore) (see specification 2 in section 5.2). Note that in this case the number of 
observations is far lower since we exclude from the analysis the products of all non-ranked brands. 
Our findings show that both variables (baseline and treatment interacted total score) are significant, 
which leads to the rejection of our third null hypothesis (H03) (Table 5). The significance of the 
baseline total score variable (TotalScore) may have three interpretations: i) it simply reflects that, 
for reasons unrelated to their CSR reputation, companies at the top of the ranking have higher 
market shares; ii) it captures a reverse causality effect between CSR and performance where top 
performers (assuming that market shares in our selected supermarkets coincide with aggregate 
world market shares) have more resources to dedicate to CSR;9 iii) it proves a direct causality effect 
where CSR has a positive impact on performance. An investigation on which of the three possible 
interpretations applies is however beyond the scope of the present research, that focuses on the 
effect of the treatment. In this respect the significance of the total score variable interacted with the 
treatment dummy shows that the treatment (informing customers about the Behind the Brands 
scores) has positive and significant effects on sales. This finding confirms previous results on 
hypothesis one showing that attracting consumers’ attention on the Behind the Brands scores 
produces effects on sales in the expected direction. 
We have argued in our theoretical background to the field experiment that rejection of the null of 
H01 (and H03) implies the presence of other-regarding preferences. We however considered that two 
of the Behind the Brands domains (Climate and Transparency) may be suspected of affecting also 
the utility of final consumers. We therefore replicate the estimations of Table 5 with total scores 
computed after excluding these two domains. Note that the ranking of the 10 companies is slightly 
modified after this change (Table 6). Results from the specification using the modified total score 
do not change significantly and the treatment interacted total score variable remains positive and 
significant (Table 7).  
In a final robustness check we wonder whether the treatment effect persists after the poster 
scorecard is removed.10 We therefore introduce in specification (2) a post-treatment dummy taking 
value one in the last two months of our experiment time spell for the two supermarkets in which the 
 
9 Empirical evidence on a causality nexus going from corporate performance to CSR is provided by 
Hong, Kubik and Scheinkman (2012).  
10 We basically remove in this respect the hypothesis of no carry-over assumption and assume that 
consumers have memory of the past treatment also in the following control period in which the 
shelf poster is removed (in stores where the treatment phase comes before the control phase). Note 
however that the violation of the no carry-over assumption would produce a downward bias in our 
findings therefore making the observed significance of the treatment effect even sharper. 
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treatment is introduced in the first two months of our experiment period (and obviously introduce as 
well the post-treatment baseline time dummy taking value one in the last two months and not 
interacted with the treatment dummy). We find that the total score treatment effect remains 
significant and that the post-treatment effect is positive and significant as well even though smaller 





By choosing to pursue corporate social and environmental responsibility, companies may contribute 
to the achievement of social and environmental goals. They may however be reluctant to follow this 
course of action due to the high costs and limited benefits of this choice. Provision of proper 
information on their responsibility scores may however help in changing this negative cost-benefit 
balance if it influences consumers’ choices in the expected direction, i.e. by generating higher sales 
for more responsible companies. In our paper we assess whether this is the case with a randomized 
field experiment where we test the salience of the Behind the Brands campaign when this 
information is made available to consumers with a scorecard poster of the ten largest world food 
companies placed at the entrance of a selected number of supermarkets. 
Findings of our experiment show that the null hypothesis of the joint insignificance of the poster 
effect on treated supermarket sales of the ranked companies is rejected. More specifically, the top 
ranked company experiences a six percent increase in its market share and, in addition to it, several 
other brands are affected in relation to their position in the rank, with those at the bottom registering 
in general a negative and significant effect. We also show that an increase in the total score 
produces a positive and significant impact on market shares. The effect of the treatment is 
concentrated on food products, consistently with the target of the Oxfam campaign.  
It is remarkable that the above mentioned results are obtained at the end of a six-year recession 
period in Italy which led to an aggregate loss of around 14 percent of household income (OECD, 
2015), since the adverse economic conditions in which our experiment is held should reduce the 
room for factors different from prices and economic convenience in consumer choices.  
Based on the theoretical background of the experiment described in the paper we argue that our 
empirical findings provide evidence in favour of the presence of other-regarding preferences. This 
is because our experimental setting does change neither prices nor the choice set of consumers, and 
the campaign domains are mostly related to corporate conduct along the supply chains on issues not 
directly concerning self-interest of final consumers.  
The main policy implication of our experiment is that social and environmental goals of the 
policymakers may be in part achieved without costs for the government budget, by just bringing 
consumers closer to the perfect information assumption of textbook economic models. This is 
because, when information on CSR is provided, a share of consumers with non-other-regarding 
preferences modifies their choices by increasing (reducing) purchases of top (bottom) CSR brands. 
This goal can be achieved by providing information at consumer places on CSR scores of product 
brands. The effect of such information on market sales and, more specifically, the positive impact of 
social and environmental responsibility, may increase CSR benefits on corporate economic 
performance thereby creating an incentive for its implementation at corporate level. The issue of 
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properly defining high/low standards of social and environmental responsibility obviously arises 
here. We did not address this problem in the paper since we were simply interested in measuring the 
effects of publicizing the rankings based on the criteria defined by Oxfam without discussing their 
merit.  
Some caveats however emerge from our analysis, since the experimental findings also include some 
apparently paradoxical results in the relation between the Behind the Brands ranking and impact on 
sales. These results may however be related, in one case, to the difficulty of linking brands to 
companies and to the different reputation between companies and brand (the Twinings tea/ABC 
case), or, in the two other cases, to consumers’ a priori beliefs and the reputation of some 
companies (the Nestlé and Coca-Cola case). This implies that the significance of policies based on 
the experiment treatment is mediated by consumers’ a priori and by its capacity of linking brands to 
products (that the online Behind the Brands website allows to do while our scorecard poster does 
not). In addition to it, the slight negative “invisibility” effect related to the small market share loss 
of companies not present in the ranking may reduce the incentive of the supermarkets to follow the 
policy. 
As a general conclusion, our findings reveal that the potential effect of more widespread 
information on corporate reputation to the general public is huge. The need for high quality 
standards for such information in order to avoid the undesired effects of manipulation and post-
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Figure 1 Scorecard of the Oxfam Behind the Brands campaign posted at supermarket entries 
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